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THe PROCeSS OF THe eSTABLISHMeNT OF 
THe INDePeNDeNCe OF THe RePUBLIC 
OF CROATIA FROM THe PeRSPeCTIve OF 
INTeRNATIONAL LAW
Budislav VUKAS* 
As Croatia recently celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the proclamation 
of its independence as a state, a question arises as to whether the complex 
processes of the establishment of its statehood are understood.  The 
responses to such a question are indeed incredible, as  seen by many facts, 
beginning with the most rudimentary of newspaper polls among  Croatian 
citizens.
The author of this work describes the legal process by which Croatia 
achieved sovereignty and independence, beginning with the constitutional 
proclamation of its independence and its severance of all constitutional 
ties with the Yugoslav Federation and its republics.  He goes on to consider 
the processes related to its international recognition. The work provides 
an overview of historical events and, in its introduction, includes a short 
review of the concept of the state as the dominant subject of international 
law.
Key words: The establishment of the independence and sovereignty of the 
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1. Introductory Notes – Concerning the State as the Dominant 
Subject in International Law
In contrast with domestic law, the role of the subject in international law 
represents one of its most complex and dynamic areas. New tendencies in the 
* Budislav Vukas, J.S.D., Faculty of Law, University of Rijeka, Rijeka, Republic of Croatia
B. VUKAS, the Process of the Establishment of the Independence of the Republic of croatia...
12
development of international law have radically expanded the number of its 
subjects. The variety of historical examples, ever increasing numbers of juris-
dictions as well as the interests of and positions taken by scholars in interna-
tional law led to the growth in the number of issues to be considered in con-
nection with subjects in international law.
Although international law today recognizes a number of subjects (re-
bellions and liberation movements, man, international organs, areas having 
a special status, the Holy See, areas having some form of a dependency rela-
tionship), the state has always been the most important, absolute, and, until 
recently, the only subject of international law.  As a result, until not too long 
ago, international law had also been known as interstate law.
A subject of international law is defined as “any person who under the pro-
visions of such law is the bearer of rights and duties, who acts directly under 
the rules of such law and is directly subject to the international legal system.”1
The state,2 and the legal provisions which govern its relations in the inter-
national community, hold a central place in international law.  The largest por-
tion of the processes and mechanisms which govern international law include 
matters related to the state.  But nevertheless, no generally accepted definition 
of the state currently exists, as reflected in numerous acts have which attempt-
ed to define the law and duties of states within the system of international 
law.  This has been similarly noted by the legal theoretician Hans Kelsen, who 
emphasized that international law has still failed to specify the unique criteria 
for the definition of a state.3
Still, it has been generally accepted that a state must meet three funda-
mental elements in order to satisfy the criteria of international law: a defined 
territory (land), population, and an independent, sovereign government.4  All 
of these elements must co-exist concurrently, and scholarly studies and prac-
tice have dealt with them in very diverse concrete situations.  This definition 
of Georg Jellinek would be later confirmed in international jurisprudence and 
would be included in subsequent attempts to codify international provisions 
1 Juraj Andrassy, et al., Međunarodno pravo I (Zagreb: Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu 
i Školska knjiga, 2010), p. 65.  Concerning the meaning of subjectivity in international law, see 
also Vladimir Đ. Degan, Međunarodno pravo (Rijeka: Pravni fakultet Sveučilište u Rijeci, 2000), 
pp. 4-5, and future editions of the same work.
2 We note here that the state has always been of special interest in theoretical-legal and consti-
tutional analyses, which have dealt with the most varied questions of its origin and organization. 
For this study, such works are not of great consequence.  As an example of such studies, one may 
consult the work of Eugen Pusić, Država i državna uprava (Zagreb: Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u 
Zagrebu, 1999).
3 Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems 
(London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1950), pp. 68 and 69.
4 Such elements first appeared in the 17th century, when sovereignty and the interaction of 
laws of equal states began to be mentioned, in contrast to the prior feudal hierarchical interstate 
relations.
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related to the legal status of the state.  These elements had been upheld in 
Deutsche Continental Gas - Geselschaft v. Polish State heard by the Joint Ger-
man-Polish Court,5 and are contained within the 1933 Convention of Monte-
viedo on the Rights and Duties of the State (Article 1),6 the 1948 International 
Court’s advisory opinion entitled “Conditions of Admission of a State to Mem-
bership in the United Nations,”7 and similar acts.
Earlier theories of international law differentiated between the derivative 
and origination means for the establishment of a state.  Those states established 
under the origination doctrine have no legal or factual ties with the prede-
cessor sovereign of its territory.  This could occur where the state had been 
established in an area not under any sovereignty (terra nullis) or where legal 
continuity with the prior state had ended.
With respect to a state formed derivatively, the state subsumes within it 
legal and factual continuities with the predecessor state, so that the newly 
formed state becomes a successor of the prior state.  Modern international law 
recognizes numerous examples and modalities of this means for the forma-
tion of a state.  For the most part, it is mentioned in situations concerning the 
disintegration of a state, the secession of a portion of a state with the goal of 
achieving its independence, the independence of dependent territories, vassal-
ages or colonies, the unification or fusion of a number of states with the intent 
to create a new one, etc. Such changes may occur through a legal act (e.g., the 
internal decisions of a predecessor state, an agreement between the metro-
politan power and its colony, an international agreement or the decision of an 
international organization (in most cases today, the United Nations)).
We will now succinctly review the three generally accepted conditions 
which a state must satisfy to become a subject of international law.
Population.
Population is the initial, and according to many, the most important element. 
A definitive state territory must have a stable population which has a legal and 
factual connection with the state. This is satisfied through the institution of 
citizenship, which is determined independently by each state.8 International 
5 5 Annual Digest of Public International Law 11 (1929).
6 The text of same may be found at, among other places, http://www.jus.uio.no/english/ser-
vices/library/treaties/01/1-02/rights-duties-states.xml.
7 1948 I.C.J. 57.
8 Under the term “citizenship” one generally understands a specific legal relationship, charac-
terized by its permanence, based on the relation between physical persons and sovereign states, 
which gives rise to certain rights and duties. International law allows states to thoroughly and 
independently control these relations, subject to only some minor exceptions. The most common 
criteria for the basis of citizenship are the principles of ius soli (citizenship based on the location 
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legal sources merely elaborate fundamental principles of citizenship, leaving it 
to states to administer citizenship in accordance with such principles.  However, 
a population also includes aliens as well as stateless persons (apatrides). their 
legal status is also a subject of interest of state normative acts in keeping with 
international legal standards. Contemporary international legal trends promote 
the interests of the population of a state with increasing numbers of provisions 
concerning the protection of human rights and ever diverse mechanisms for 
their realization and oversight.
The size of the population of a state is not determinative in delimiting a 
state’s territory nor does it form a condition for recognition, as evidenced by 
the recent entry of a number of countries with very small numbers of inhabit-
ants into the most important international organizations, whose members can 
only be states.
State Territory.
State territory is the second component of a state’s subjectivity in interna-
tional law. Positive international law contains numerous provisions concern-
ing state territory and allows states to come to terms concerning their territo-
rial questions independently and on a bilateral basis.
The territory of a state consists of the land portion of the state bounded 
by frontiers as well as the entire area above such land.  In the case of maritime 
states, the territory of such a state includes the area of its internal seas and terri-
torial seas, including the water column, the subsoil of its sea and corresponding 
aerial territory.  So-called archipelagic states have the right to proclaim archi-
pelagic waters, whose status only slightly varies from those of territorial waters. 
The international law of the sea has also created regimes which allow states 
to hold “sovereign rights” and “jurisdiction” in certain other areas of the sea 
outside of the range of the state’s territory, i.e., outside of its border on the sea.
For international law, the size of a territory is of no importance.  Examples 
of a number of countries show that a territory need not be physically joined 
together.  It also does not demand the exact demarcation of borders as a pre-
condition to recognition and its acceptance as a subject of international law.9
where the physical person had been born) and ius sanguinis (the citizenship of a parent).  See, 
for example, Ivo Borković, Upravno pravo (Zagreb: Informator, 6th ed., 1997), p. 147 et seq.  In 
connection with the formation of new institutions of the European Union, a special form of 
European citizenship or citizenship of the European Union has appeared. See Dario Đerda, “O 
državljanstvu u Europske unije,” Pravo i porezi – časopis za pravnu i ekonomsku teoriju i praksu 
(2002, 11): 83-88.
9 As has already been noted, a large portion of international law concerns questions connected 
with state territory.  Such matters are generally termed as “objects of international law” within 
which certain disciplines, such as the international law of the sea, have been established as sepa-
rate subspecialties of international law.
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Sovereignty (Supreme Power).
Sovereignty, or the supremacy of state power, is the third element that 
must be met for any territorial subject to be recognized as a subject of inter-
national law and deemed a state.  Sovereignty is defined as the supreme power 
of a state over its territory, which excludes other states and is not subject to 
any superior power.10  In contemporary international relations, sovereignty is 
also understood as the right of a subject of international law to determine the 
conduct of its own foreign affairs, which includes the determination to enter 
into international agreements or to join alliances and international organiza-
tions.  Although a state may be sovereign, it does not have unlimited power. 
Along with the need to respect generally accepted customary law, a state is also 
bound by the international treaties it enters into.
The most important requirement of international law in connection with 
sovereignty is without a doubt the effectiveness of a state’s government, i.e., its 
ability to independently adopt and carry out legal acts.  Effectiveness, however, 
does not require complete control over all of a state’s territory.  The temporary 
occupation or conquest of part of a territory does not act as an impediment to 
a claim that a certain government exercises effective control.  Effectiveness can 
be deemed to exist where a state’s government is prevented from controlling 
the entire area of a state due to internal revolts or instability.11
A state’s satisfaction of these cumulative preconditions causes it to become 
an absolute subject of international law, with all of its characteristics.  To this 
one must add the legal capabilities of a state (as a bearer of international du-
ties and obligations) and its ability act, which may concern either its ability to 
conduct its affairs or its ability to commit delicts.  A state’s ability to conduct its 
affairs differs somewhat from that in domestic law.  For example, it includes ius 
contrahendi (the ability for the subject to enter into international agreements), 
ius legitimationis (the ability for the subject to exchange representatives with 
other subjects), and ius in bello (the duty of the subject to respect the interna-
tional law of war).  By the ability to commit delicts, one means the ability of 
the subject to cause harm to another subject, whether by acts (either with or 
without agreements) or omissions, as a result of which the subject commits 
an international delict and may be subject to international sanctions. Inter-
national delicts remain uncodified, but customary law along with scholarly 
discussions and practices, more than adequately provide enough sources for 
the application of this concept.
10 According to the definition of Vladimir Ð. Degan, Međunarodno pravo, p. 228.  It is similarly 
defined in the works of other authors.  Concerning the development of the term sovereignty and 
its “internal” meaning, see Krbek’s studies related to sovereignty in the Yugoslav Academy’s Rad 
(1964/65), no. 334 and no. 339.
11 Concerning sovereignty as a category of international law, see Juraj Andrassy, “Opće među-
narodno pravo o suverenosti,” Jugoslavenska revija za međunarodno pravo (1969, 3): 333-341.
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the international recognition of a state has become a customary event in 
the absolute affirmation of a state in international life.  According the Insti-
tute for International Law of 1936, international recognition is “a free act in 
which one state, or more of them, pronounces on the existence of [another] 
state and shows its will that it considers [such other state] to be a member of 
the international community.”12  International recognition is not a key to the 
establishment of a state.  A state arises in a particular way, having the three ele-
ments discussed inn this paper.  International recognition only affirms its for-
mation.  Recognition is merely a declaratory act, not a constituent one.13  the 
theory and practice of international law differentiates between de iure and de 
facto recognition, depending on the permanency and conditionality of the act 
of recognition.  An announcement of international recognition may be made 
publicly or privately.  There are numerous examples in which recognition is 
provided subject to certain conditions or the satisfaction of some criteria.
The international recognition of a state must be contrasted with the rec-
ognition of a government.  The latter is characterized by situations where a 
previously existing and recognized state has been the subject of an unconsti-
tutional change in government, which thus poses the question of the interna-
tional recognition of such an illegal government.  This legal issue needs to be 
considered in the context of sensitive political implications which such a situ-
ation may cause.  International law has established its practice concerning the 
recognition of such governments.  Such an act is based on the prior diplomatic 
relations with the state in question, as well as the general legislative work of the 
new government.
International legal understanding of the state as a subject of international 
law remains a complicated and diverse.  Contemporary trends in international 
law revolve around the perspective of the disappearance of certain historical 
forms of subjectivity (such as tributary principalities) as well as the appearance 
of a number of completely new subjects, including supranational organs such 
as the European Union.  For purposes of this work, it is not possible to delve 
into other questions concerning the state and other subjects of international law, 
such as, for example, questions concerning the rights and obligations of states, or 
questions concerning the merger of states, the end of the existence of a state, etc.
12 The definition is cited in Andrassy, et al., Međunarodno pravo I, p. 91.
13 Those favoring the position that international recognition is a constituent act argue that it is 
a fourth, cumulative element necessary for a state to become a subject under international law. 
Because the international community has no central body which could grant such recognition, 
states provide such recognition on an individual basis as members of the “international system.” 
The determination to grant recognition must be made within the constraints of legal principles. 
The supporters of this view include Dionisio Anzilotti, Hans Kelsen, Hersch Lauterpach, Op-
penheim, and others. See further discussions concerning this matter in Vladimir Đ. Degan, 
Hrvatska država u međunarodnoj zajednici (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus, 2002), pp. 55-59.
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A large number of these issues made their appearance during the period 
that Croatian independence had been formulated.  Thus, positions taken by 
ad hoc arbitration bodies which determined the legality of the acts related to 
Croatian independence relied on the understanding of international law con-
cerning the state.
2. The Major Constitutional Decisions of the Croatian Parliament 
(Sabor) in 1991 – Toward the establishment of Croatian Statehood
The major constitutional decisions of the Croatian Parliament (Sabor) 
in 1991 must be considered within the wider historical context of watershed 
events which took place during the end of the eighties and beginning of the 
nineties of the 20th century.  This represented a time of radical changes to the 
entire system of international relations and the end of bipolarity and the Cold 
War, which led to the collapse of the Soviet state and its political and eco-
nomic system, and, which, in turn, led to new reformist demands in many 
Central European states.  The position of the United States also changed.  It 
now became a unilateral actor in international relations, even though it began 
to speak about finding and defining a so-called New World Order.14  Trends 
toward strengthening European institutions accompanied these events, such 
as in the reformist moves of the European Economic Union (later known as 
the European Union) (EU), but also in organizations such as the OECD (of 
special significance is the Charter of Paris of 1990).15.  This article can not delve 
more deeply into these questions, which have already been treated elsewhere.16
Croatia faced the events surrounding the fall of the Communist system 
in somewhat different circumstances in comparison with other Central Eu-
ropean countries.  Its formal, legal position, in keeping with the 1974 Consti-
tution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), included some 
relatively clear elements of statehood (defined, of course, by standard Socialist 
ideology), and even some characteristics of subjectivity under international 
law.  But, the disintegration of the entire Yugoslav social, governmental and 
economic system, which had been weakened during its search for new re-
formist solutions, became dangerous when it became tied to Greater Serbian 
14 Concerning this, see Radovan Vukadinović, Postkomunistički izazovi europskoj sigurnosti – 
od Jadrana do Baltika (Mostar: Zial, 1997).
15 The Charter of Paris for a New Europe.  The text of the Charter can be found at http://www.
osce.org/mc/39516.
16 Ennio di Nolfo, Storia delle relazioni internazionali 1919. - 1999. (Bologna: Edizione Laterza, 
2005), pp. 1347-1411; Peter Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945 (London: Longman, 1996); 
Constantine Pleshakov, Berlino 1989 e caduta del muro - la guerra civile che ha portato alla fine 
dell comunismo (Corbazzio: 2009); Padraic Kenney, The Burdens of Freedom: Eastern Europe 
Since 1989 (London: Zed Books, 2006); Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York Simon & Schus-
ter, 1994), p. 762 et. seq.
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policies.  Originating in intellectual circles, Greater Serbianism became sub-
limated with the Communist Party’s leading nomenklatura, gathered around 
the new main leader of Serbian Communists, Slobodan Milošević.  In certain 
instances, the protagonists of Greater Serbianism expertly cloaked themselves 
under the banner of saving the Yugoslav community, relying on the forces of 
the Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA).  The Croatian leadership, which sought to 
make maximum use the constitutional position of the Socialist Republic (SR) 
of Croatia, did not at first have enough force and determination to successfully 
meet the challenges posed by the aggressive provocations of Milošević.  Still, 
it began to implement the initial constitutional revisions required for a radi-
cal change in the existing system, one headed toward its democratization and 
liberalization.  This became especially obvious in the legal reformist moves 
towards the introduction of a multiparty system, the announcement and or-
ganization of elections, and the call for constituent meetings of the Croatian 
Parliament.
From a constitutional perspective, the new democratic government sig-
nificantly quickened the path toward the establishment of Croatian statehood. 
These steps would act as the basis for the adoption of key constitutional deci-
sions by the Croatian Parliament in 1991.  Following the formation of the new 
democratic government (after 30 May 1990), amendments to the Constitution 
of the SR of Croatian (25 July 1990) abandoned the Socialist attributes found 
in state symbols, as well as in the general characteristics of the organization of 
government.  The strengthening executive power (a Government replaced the 
former Executive Council of the Parliament), separated powers among three 
branches of the government, in contrast with the prior emphasis on the prin-
ciple of the government’s unity.17
The pinnacle of the constitutional process of establishing the Croatian state 
is without doubt the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia,18 
the so-called “Christmas Constitution” (22 December 1990).  The Constitution 
accepted the position of the Republic of Croatia within the Yugoslav State, set-
ting forth in its transitional and final provisions possible scenarios in case of a 
breach of the fundamental interests of the Republic.  But, it also clearly spelled 
out the desire of the Croatian Republic to be constituted as an independent 
and sovereign state.  While Article 140 of the Constitution states that the “Re-
public of Croatia remains within the SFRY,” two provisions of the Constitution 
clearly reflect the determination to establish the state’s independence.  First, 
the Constitution allowed the Parliament to undertake such a decision (which 
in fact the Parliament did through its acts in June and October 1991), and, sec-
ond, it anticipated the possibility of coming to terms with the other Yugoslav 
republics concerning a new constitutional arrangement.  Taking into account 
17 For sources, see Anđelko Milardović, Dokumenti o državnosti Republike Hrvatske (Zagreb: 
Alineja, 1992). 
18 Ustav Republike Hrvatske, Narodne novine, 56/90.
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the complexities surrounding the Yugoslav crises, the Parliament, through 
Paragraph 2 of the same Article listed the possible dangers as being a threat to 
the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, its placement in an unequal 
position within the Yugoslav state or a threat to its interests (by any body of 
the Federation or from other republics or provinces).  In this Paragraph, which 
is subordinate to the first Paragraph of this Article, the Republican organs be-
came specifically charged with adopting special acts to protect the interests of 
the Republic.  These acts were further spelled out in the Constitutional Law 
for the Implementation of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, which 
temporarily suspended a number of sections of the Constitution (e.g., foreign 
affairs, defense).19
The major Croatian constitutional decisions, which represent the basis for 
the establishment of the Croatian state as a subject of international law, were 
adopted in 1991.  Extremely difficult diplomatic conditions, which remained 
completely at odds with Croatian national interests, required the Parliament 
to take complex and unique steps in connection with independence.  This in 
part made the establishment of Croatia’s legal and factual sovereignty more 
complicated as well as more arduous.
The first extraordinary event on the road toward independence and the 
constitutional establishment of a free and sovereign Croatian Republic was the 
Determination (Odluka) of the President of the Republic of Croatia concern-
ing the holding of a referendum, issued on 25 April 1991.  The Determination 
set a 19 May 1991 referendum which presented two questions to voters:
1. Are you in favor that Republic of Croatia, as a sovereign and 
independent state, which guarantees the cultural autonomy and all 
civil rights of Serbs and members of other nationalities in Croatia, 
may enter into a federation of sovereign states with the other republics 
(in accordance with the proposal of the Republic of Croatia and the 
Republic of Slovenia to resolve the SFRY state crises)?
2.   Are you in favor that the Republic of Croatia remain in Yugoslavia as a 
unified federal state (in accordance with the proposal of the Republic 
of Serbia and the Socialist Republic of Montenegro to resolve the 
SFRY state crisis)?
Reports concerning the referendum’s results confirmed the undeniable ex-
pression of the desire of the great majority of the Croatian people concerning 
the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia.20  With respect 
to the first question, 2,845,521 voted in favor, representing 93.24% of all voters. 
19 Concerning the means by which the Christmas Constitution was adopted, see Duška Šarin, 
Nastanak hrvatskoga Ustava (Zagreb: Narodne novine, 1997).
20 According to the referendum results collected from 7,691 polling stations, out of 3,592,827 
registered voters, 3,051,881, or 83,56 %, voted in the referendum.
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A somewhat lower number voted against the second referendum question. 
This represented not only a further affirmation of the voting public’s approval 
of the path taken by the Croatian state’s leadership to establish an independent 
and sovereign Croatian Republic, but also a clear demand by the citizens of the 
Republic for its full independence.
The end of May and early June 1991 marked the complete breakdown of all 
discussions among the leaders of the Yugoslav republics.  Constant provoca-
tions by local Serbs and the Yugoslav Army on the ground threatened to es-
calate an extremely dangerous situation into open conflict.  The political situ-
ation remained murky, while constant meetings among the Presidents of the 
Yugoslav republics led to no acceptable solution.21  During this period, Presi-
dent Tuđman and Slovenian President Kučan discussed questions concerning 
future bilateral relations after the proclamation of independence.  All bodies of 
the Croatian government began to prepare for the adoption of the act concern-
ing the independence and sovereignty of the Croatian state.
At its meeting on 25 June 1991, the Croatian Parliament adopted the most 
important Constitutional acts proclaiming the independence and sovereignty 
of the Croatian state.  These decisions are expressed in two acts: the Constitu-
tional Decision Concerning the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic 
of Croatia (the Constitutional Decision), and the Declaration Concerning the 
Proclamation of the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Croatia 
(the Constitutional Declaration).  One should also mention the Constitutional 
Law Concerning Amendments and Additions to the Constitutional Law for 
the Implementation of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (the Con-
stitutional Implementation Law).22
Pursuant to the Constitutional Decision, the Parliament proclaimed the 
Republic of Croatia as an independent and sovereign state (Point I), and an-
nounced that the Republic would begin the processes to disassociate itself from 
the other republics of the SFRY and to seek international recognition (Point 
II).  Pursuant to this act, the Parliament determined that international agree-
ments which had been entered into and ratified by the SFRY would be adopted 
by the Republic of Croatia to the extent that they did not contradict the Con-
stitution and the legal system of the Republic, in keeping with international 
law concerning the succession of states with respect to treaties (Point IV).  The 
Parliament further determined that only those laws it adopts would be effec-
tive in the territory of the Republic, as would those laws of the SFRY which the 
21 Even the newly announced Platform Concerning the Reorganization of the Yugoslav State, 
authored by Alija Izetbegović and Kiro Gligorov, did not propose a solution which would give 
any indication that the crisis would be overcome. This compromise proposal, supported by cer-
tain leftist circles in Croatia and Slovenia, remained unacceptable to the leadership of the Croa-
tian state, which already had a plan outlined for the proclamation of independence, and had 
been even more unacceptable to Greater Serbian, Unitarian circles.
22 All of these acts appear in Narodne novine, 31/1991.
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Parliament did not repeal until such time as the process of disassociation had 
been completed.  The Republic assumed all rights and duties which under the 
Constitutions of the Republic of Croatia and the SFRY had been undertaken 
by organs of the SFRY, subject to the condition that such assumption would be 
governed by a Constitutional Law (Point V).  The Constitutional Decision fur-
ther declared the boundaries of the state would be based on the international 
legal principle of uti possidetis iuris (which would later be affirmed pursuant 
to the positions taken by the Badinter Commission).23  The borders of Croa-
tia would be set as the internationally recognized ones of the former SFRY as 
same related to the Republic, as well as the boundaries as had existed within 
the framework of the SFRY between the Republic of Croatia and each of the 
Republics of Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro (Point 
VI).  By accepting the principles of the Charter of Paris, the Croatian Repub-
lic guaranteed all of its citizens all national and other rights and freedoms, a 
democratic system, the rule of law and all other privileges of its constitutional 
and the international legal systems.
The legal nature of the Constitutional Decision has been reviewed by Anto 
Milušić, who specifically looked at it from a constitutional viewpoint.  Among 
other things, he notes that the “[c]onstitutional importance of the Constitu-
tional Decision is a key element in the achievement of the independence of 
the Croatian state, in a legal process which began with the adoption of the 
[Christmas Constitution].  The determination of the Croatian Parliament pur-
suant to which ‘the Republic of Croatian proclaims itself as a sovereign and 
independent state’ is of a constituent legal nature and expresses the high point 
of that entire legal process. It only lacked the determination of the Republic 
of Croatia to disassociate itself from the Yugoslav federation, which would be 
adopted only after a three month moratorium mandated at the behest of the 
international community, in the context of which the Constitutional Decision 
was not implemented.”24  As discussed below, theoreticians of international law 
look upon the Constitutional Decision in somewhat different light.
The Constitutional Declaration contained the elemental principles and 
arguments in favor of the proclamation of Croatia’s sovereignty and indepen-
dence.  Thus, the Declaration discusses constitutional continuity, emphasiz-
ing Croatian statehood within the framework of the Yugoslav federation.  The 
Constitutional Declaration consolidates previously expressed bases of the con-
stitutional principles of the legal system of the Croatian Republic, as well as 
the path of the overall future work of Croatian policies toward the remaining 
republics of the SFRY.  The last Point of the Declaration (Point V) sets forth 
the criteria for future cooperation with the Yugoslav republics with the goal to 
23 The work of the Commission is further discussed below.
24 A. Milušić, “Povijesne odluke Hrvatskog sabora od 25. lipnja i 8. listopada 1991.,” Zbornik 
Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci (2001), no. 1: 349.  Concerning his position and views con-
cerning these constitutional decisions, see also Vladimir Đ. Degan, Hrvatska država, pp. 240, 241.
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create a possible federation of sovereign states on a confederal basis.  Milušić 
describes the legal nature of the Constitutional Declaration as an act having 
only a declaratory nature, as it merely confirms previously adopted decisions 
set forth in the Constitutional Decision.
The Constitutional Implementation Law brought into force those Con-
stitutional provisions which had not been implemented after their adoption, 
which for the most part concerned matters related to international relations 
and defense.  The Parliament repeated its fundamental support for the protec-
tion of the rights of people and minorities in its Declaration Concerning the 
Rights of Serbs and Other Nationalities in the Republic of Croatia.25
These decisions of the Croatian Parliament, adopted on the same day that 
Slovenia declared its independence, would have important effects on the fur-
ther radicalization of relations in the evolving Yugoslav crisis.  The JNA be-
gan its aggression against Slovenia only a day later, while the crisis in Croatia 
would also soon escalate into an open aggressive war by Serbia and Monte-
negro, with the assistance of the JNA, against the Croatian Republic.  The in-
ternational community, in an attempt to influence the resolution of the crisis, 
pressured the Croatian leadership to impose a three-month moratorium on 
the previously mentioned Constitutional decisions concerning Croatia’s sov-
ereignty and independence, during which time an agreement could be nego-
tiated among the Yugoslav republics.  This was set forth in the 7 July 1991 
Brioni Declaration.26  The Brioni Declaration confirmed the basic principles 
for future relations among the Yugoslav republics with the goal of resolving the 
crisis and established an Observational Mission of the European Community 
for Yugoslavia (Annex II).  The Declaration further set forth the specific provi-
sions concerning the preparations for negotiations (Annex I).27
The conclusion of the Brioni moratorium, along with the above mentioned 
circumstances, influenced the further steps of the Croatian government to-
ward the goal of achieving full independence and cutting off all constitutional 
25 Narodne novine, 31/1991.
26 Common Declaration (Brioni Declaration of 7 July 1991), as cited in A. Milardović, Doku-
menti o državnosti, pp. 114 – 117.
27 The Brioni Declaration would in the end be only partially implemented.  Its main aim, to 
commence negotiations among the Yugoslav republics to resolve the crisis, never got started, 
while events on the ground reflected the need for defense from the now open aggression against 
the Croatian Republic.  Croatia became forced to wage a defensive war (known as the Homeland 
War) against Serbia, Montenegro and the Yugoslav Army.  Given the passivity of the interna-
tional community, which even imposed an arms embargo on the Republic, conditions in Croatia 
at the time became extremely uncertain and critical.  In its military operations, the aggressor 
violated basic provisions of international humanitarian law.  The Croatian leadership, led from 
August 1991 by a coalition Government of Democratic Unity, faced the extremely difficult tasks 
of organizing the defense of the state, which in such unique and critical times opened other 
very complex questions (humanitarian assistance, questions concerning displaced persons and 
refugees, etc.).
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ties with the republics of the SFRY as well as with the Federation.  This is con-
tained in the Croatian Parliament’s 8 October 1991 Decision Concerning the 
Termination of Constitutional Ties (Termination Decision), which severed the 
bonds forming the basis of the SFRY between the Republic of Croatia and the 
remaining republics and provinces of the SFRY.28  This represented the last 
act in the constitutional process of establishing an independent and sovereign 
Croatian state.  From and after 8 October 1991, the Republic of Croatian ef-
fectively becomes a subject of international law, and such date is viewed as 
the beginning of the international life of the Republic.  The declaratory act of 
international recognition would later only reaffirm the effective establishment 
of the legal status created on 8 October 1991.
Relying on the right of self-determination of the Croatian people, the 
SFRY’s 1974 Constitution and its legitimate decisions concerning the estab-
lishment of a sovereign and independent state, and confirming the expiration 
of the moratorium, the Croatian Parliament in the initial two Points of the 
Termination Decision broke all constitutional ties “on the basis of which [the 
Republic of Croatia] together with the other republics and provinces had cre-
ated the present-day SFRY.”  Based on the Termination Decision, Croatia re-
jected the further legitimacy and legality of all organs of the Federation, and 
refused to recognize any legal action of any organ which acted in the name of 
the SFRY.  The Republic of Croatia thus announced that it would continue the 
process of disassociation with the republics, provinces and Federation, setting 
forth in the Termination Decision a position which would be soon affirmed by 
the international community – that Yugoslavia no longer exists!  The Termina-
tion Decision also contained provisions which clearly reflected the determi-
nation of the Republic to base its international relations (including with the 
other republics of the former SFRY) on the most widely accepted principles of 
international law.
Placing the legal nature of these constitutional processes within the con-
text of the establishment of the state, Milušić claims that “[f]rom the constitu-
tional viewpoint, the [Termination Decision] of the Croatian Parliament is of 
a declaratory legal nature in comparison with [those related to] the establish-
ment of the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Croatia, based 
on constituent legal act of the Constitutional Decision of 25 June 1991.  Never-
theless, that portion in the Parliament’s [Termination Decisions of] 8 October 
1991, which asserts the basic legal fact of the severance of the constitutional 
ties of the Republic of Croatia and other republics and provinces of the former 
SFRY, is of a constituent legal nature.  Two further provisions in this [Termi-
nation Decision] are of a constituent legal nature, which represent the legal 
outcome of the prior one.  They are that the Republic of Croatia: (i) rejects the 
legitimacy and legality of all organs of the former Federation, and (ii) does not 
28 Narodne novine, 53/1991.
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recognize the validity of any legal decision of any body acting in the name of 
the former SFRY.”29
In contrast with Milušić, who views the Termination Decision from an ex-
plicitly constitutional position, Vladimir Đ. Degan approaches the issue from 
an analysis of the international legal nature of the Termination Decision.  He 
especially notes that “[t]he Referendum of 19 May [1991] represented a legal 
manifestation of the Croatian people’s exercise of their right to self-determi-
nation, while the [Termination Decision] of 8 October [1991] represented an 
act by which the Republic of Croatia achieved status as an international legal 
subject.”30  Vesna Barić-Punda similarly follows the same path, viewing the 
constitutional decisions of the Croatian parliament of 25 June 1991 as being 
merely “an expression of the desires of the Croatian people for an independent, 
sovereign and free state,”31 basing her conclusions on the positions taken by 
the later Badinter Commission and the Vienna Conventions on Succession of 
States of 1978 and 1983.  Barić-Punda places the Parliament’s 8 October 1991 
decisions within the context of state succession, which gives them a constitu-
ent legal importance, labeling 8 October 1991, in keeping with international 
agreements concerning state succession, “the date of succession.”32
Although Milušić’s theses may be understood as part of a deeper consti-
tutional analysis of the legal nature of the Parliament’s 25 June 1991 decisions, 
the constituent nature of such decisions does not seem apparent.  Those deci-
sions were quickly suspended (8 July 1991) while their implementation dur-
ing the period between 25 June and 8 July 1991 were not completely effective, 
given the obstacles placed on the Croatian government’s ability to then act as 
a completely sovereign and independent state and especially given the short-
ness of time during which these decisions had been in force.  As a result, it 
remains difficult to defend the position that Croatia had been constitutionally 
established as a free and sovereign state as early as 25 June 1991 (though this 
does not, of course, undermine the importance of those decisions (which, one 
should note, the Parliament had not unanimously accepted!)).  Insisting on 
such a position would mean seeing sovereignty exclusively as a nudum ius, 
setting aside the factual components of the term sovereignty which remains 
elemental to its substance.33
29 Anto Milušić, “Povijesne odluke Hrvatskog sabora”: 357.
30 Vladimir Đ. Degan, Hrvatska država, p. 243. 
31 Vesna Barić-Punda, “Hrvatska od samostalnosti i nezavisnosti do međunarodnog priznan-
ja,” Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu (2001), 4 (64):341.
32 Loc. cit.
33 See the further discussion in Budislav Vukas, ml., “Državnopravni aspekti konstituiranja 
hrvatske države (1989 – 1992),” - Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci 23 (????), no. 2: 
645 – 681; Sandra Fabijanić Gagro and Budislav Vukas, ml., “Pravna priroda i politička pozadina 
oružanih sukoba u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini, “ in Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u 
Zagrebu (2008, 5): 1159-1199.
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3. The International Recognition of the Republic of Croatia
From the start, the international affirmation of Croatia had been very 
complicated and characterized by many challenges.  Croatia had been part of 
the intricate and uncertain international political processes tied to the collapse 
of Communism in Eastern Europe, which radically altered the foreign policy 
imperatives of the new democracies.  But, the Croatian position faced road-
block posed by the strong international standing of Yugoslavia, a reflection 
of the legacy of Josip Broz Tito.  The continuation and reform of the Yugoslav 
state had been thought to be a guarantee of stability in Southeastern Europe, 
as shown by numerous diplomatic trends from 1989 through the end of 1991. 
The Serbian leadership surrounding Slobodan Milošević attempted to make 
use of this situation.  Initial instability, whose sources we can not go into in this 
paper (nor can we discuss in this work the wider international political context 
surrounding the Yugoslav crisis), grew into a brutal military attack against the 
Republic of Croatia.  This constellation of international political events and 
the large variety of actors in the international community would have a direct 
influence on the international legal decisions concerning the fate of the former 
Yugoslav states, as well as the international recognition of its republics.34
3.1. The Opinions of the Arbitration or  Badinter Commission
In light of its inability to restrain Greater Serbian provocations, which rose 
to open military conflict in the summer of 1991 with clear elements of aggres-
sion against the Republic of Croatia, the EU established various ad hoc bodies 
with the goal to mediate among the parties and, along with other tasks, to 
bring about a peaceful solution to the conflict.   As a result, the Conference on 
Yugoslavia came to be established which would itself create technical teams as 
a result of its inability to come to decisions on key constitutional and interna-
tional legal questions.  The most well know of these is certainly the Arbitration 
Commission.
The Commission consisted of five experts in constitutional law from EU 
countries, and became more commonly known by the name of its chairman, 
the head of the French Constitutional Court, Robert Badinter.  The Commis-
sion’s positions became especially important from the viewpoint of interna-
tional law since they would legally define newly established relations resulting 
from and guide the further varied paths concerning the Yugoslav crisis.  Their 
importance also stems from the fact that they opposed Serbian arguments 
concerning the principle of the self-determination of peoples when Serbia 
34  See further discussions concerning this in Budislav Vidas, ml., “Državnopravni aspekti kon-
stituiranja”.
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used that principle in an attempt to legally justify its policies toward the Croa-
tian Republic.
The Commission initially expressed it general view by emphasizing in its 
Opinion No. 1 that “the existence or disappearance of the state is a question of 
fact . . . . the effects of recognition by other states are purely declaratory.”  The 
Opinion defined a state on the basis of widely accepted doctrines and prac-
tices of international law concerning the state as its main subject.  Thus, the 
state is “defined as a community which consists of a territory and a population 
subject to an organized political authority; that such a state is characterized by 
sovereignty.”35
The Commission found that Yugoslavia was then in the process of disin-
tegration.  It based its conclusion on international legal preconditions to the 
existence of a state.  Thus, the Arbitration Commission confirmed that the 
basic organs of the Federation no longer carried out their functions as bodies 
of a federated state, a state that had lost control over its own territory.36
A similar position would be repeated in the Commission’s Opinion No. 8 
of 4 July 1992 concerning the dissolution of Yugoslavia where the Commission 
reaffirmed “that the process of dissolution of the SFRY referred to in Opinion 
1 of 29 November 1991 is now complete and that the SFRY no longer exists.”37 
As a result, in later Opinions, mostly issued in connection with questions con-
cerning state succession, the position would be taken that the process of the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia commenced as of 29 November 1991, with the issu-
ance of Opinion No. 1, and ended on 4 July 1992 with the position expressed in 
Opinion No. 8.  This stance would be affirmed in Resolution 777 of the United 
Nations’ Security Council adopted on 19 September 1992.  The major argu-
ments in favor of this conclusion included the previously mentioned facts that 
the Federal organs no longer functioned based on their constitutional duties 
and that the population on the territory of the SFRY had been placed under the 
effective jurisdictions of the government of the sovereign republics.
35 The text of Opinion Nos. 1 through 3 can be found in Alain Pellet, “The Opinions of the 
Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples,” 3 Eur. 
J. Int’l L. (1992): 178, 182-83.  All quotes and citations in this text from Opinion Nos. 1 through 
3 are from such article.
36 This determination proved to be of great importance as delegates in the Federal bodies of 
the SFRY, especially those from Serbia and Montenegro, continued to present themselves as the 
legitimate representatives of the Yugoslav federation.  Thus, the rump Presidency of the SFRY, 
composed of only the representatives of Serbia, Montenegro, and the Serbian Autonomous 
Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, adopted a resolution on 4 November 1991 which stated 
that the Presidency continues to function as a governmental body.
37 The text of the Arbitration Commission’s Opinions Nos. 4 through 10 can be found in Danilo 
Türk, “Recognition of States: A Comment,” 4 Eur. J. Int’l L. (1993): 66, 74-91.  All quotes and 
citations in this text to Opinion Nos. 4 through 10 are from such article.
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Opinion No. 1, along with later positions take by the Arbitration Com-
mission, accepted as fundamental that the borders of the newly formed states 
had to be based on the principal of uti possidetis iuris.  In reaching such a 
finding, the Arbitration Commission took into account the right of people to 
self-determination as such principle is used in the United Nations Charter.38
Pursuant to these principles, the international frontiers of the newly-estab-
lished states became the inter-republican, administrative-territorial borders of 
the former SFRY.  Frontiers with third parties remained the same for the new 
states and the established border regimes could not be a subject of succession. 
The Arbitration Commission noted that international law does not make clear 
all the consequence which flow from the right of self-determination, neverthe-
less, as it stated in its Opinion No. 2, it is well-established that, “whatever the 
circumstances, the right to self-determination must not involve changes to ex-
isting frontiers at the time of independence (uti possidetis juris) except where 
the states concerned agree otherwise.”
Thus, by defining the frontiers of the newly formed states, the Commission 
confirmed the principle of the inviolability of borders, emphasizing that they 
cannot be changed absent the agreement of the parties involved.  The Com-
mission expressed its position concerning the application of the principle uti 
possidetis juris in its Opinion No. 3 as follows: “Except where otherwise agreed, 
the former boundaries become frontiers protected by international law.  This 
conclusion follows from the principle of respect for the territorial status quo 
and, in particular, from the principle of uti possidetis.  Uti possidetis, though 
initially applied in settling decolonization issues in America and Africa, is to-
day recognized as a general principle . . . .”39
38  Vladimir Đ. Degan, “Samoodređenje naroda i teritorijalna cjelovitost država u uvjetima 
raspada Jugoslavije,” Zakonitost (1992, 3): 543.- 569.
39  This principle had been adopted in connection with questions surrounding decolonization 
in Central and South America in the 19th Century and received its affirmation in the opinions 
of the International Court during the period of decolonization in Africa.  It further had been 
called upon prior to the disintegration of the USSR and Czechoslovakia.  The Arbitration Com-
mission cited to this principle to resolve questions related to borders. A relatively rich amount 
of materials from international judicial decisions exists which confirms this principle. Vesna 
Crnić-Grotić thus concludes that “in reviewing available international judicial decisions as well 
as the decisions of political bodies of international organizations such as the UN, the [EU], the 
CSCE, [one can conclude] that . . . the principle of uti possidetis iuris is a general principle of 
international law which is applied in cases concerning decolonization and the disintegration of 
federal states.”  Vesna Crnić-Grotić, “Načelo uti possidetis u međunarodnom pravu,” Zbornik 
Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilište u Rijeci (1995, 2): 295-308.
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3.2 Conditions Imposed by the european Community for the International 
Recognition of the Independence of States on the Territory of Former 
Yugoslavia – 16 December 1991
Based on the above-mentioned Opinions of the Arbitration Commission, 
the overall circumstances surrounding the aggression of Serbia and the rem-
nants of the JNA against Croatia and the desire of four of the republics of the 
former SFRY to receive international recognition, the EU decided to adopt 
certain criteria for the extension of such recognition.  As Yugoslavia did not 
then represent the only instance of a large federation going through a similar 
process of disintegration, the EU adopted similar criteria for both the former 
Yugoslavia and the USSR.  On 16 December 1991, an extraordinary summit 
meeting of European foreign ministers in Brussels adopted the Declaration 
on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in 
the Soviet Union as well as a Declaration on Yugoslavia.40  These documents 
do not set forth the three elements of statehood, but only discuss the condi-
tions under which international recognition would be granted.  Looking at it 
from the viewpoint of international legal doctrine, we can classify this type of 
recognition as conditional as opposed to unconditional.  While, the foreign 
ministers of the EU member states accepted the legitimacy of creating specific 
states from the view of international law and accepted the right of peoples to 
self-determination, they agreed that they would grant recognition to each such 
state separately, subject to the requirement that each one satisfy all of the fol-
lowing conditions:
1. that the state respect the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations 
and the obligations set forth in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter 
of Paris, especially with respect to the rule of law, democracy and human 
rights;
2. that the state guarantee the rights of ethnic and national groups and 
minorities in accordance with the obligations accepted within the 
framework of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe;
3. that the state respect the inviolability of all borders which can only be 
modified through peaceful means and through mutual agreements;
4. that the state accept all relevant obligations concerning disarmament and 
nuclear nonproliferation, as well as those related to security and regional 
stability; and
5. that the state agree to settle by agreement all disputes, including, where 
appropriate, by arbitration, including all questions concerning state 
succession and regional disputes.
40  The texts of both Declarations are found in Türk, “Recognition of States,” pp. 72-73.
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The EU member states emphasized their opposition to granting recogni-
tion to any territorial unit which resulted from aggression and that they would 
take into account the effects of recognition on neighboring states.  But, along 
with these material-legal conditions for recognizing new states, the EU mem-
ber states also adopted a number of formal-legal conditions of a pseudo-legal 
character in which they could consider not only the satisfaction of the above-
listed conditions but the opportuness of granting recognition.41
These were set forth in the Declaration on Yugoslavia adopted on the same 
day.  Based on that Declaration, the EU and its member states determined that 
they would grant recognition on 15 January 1992 to those Yugoslav republics 
(i.e., the former federal units of the SFRY) which provided the following state-
ments by 23 December 1991:
1. that they wish to be recognized as independent states;
2. that they accept the obligations implicit in the above-mentioned 
Guidelines on Recognition;
3. that they accept the provisions set forth in the Agreement concerning 
the Convention42 then being discussed by the Conference on Yugoslavia, 
especially those in Chapter II on human rights and rights of national and 
ethnic groups;
4. that they continue to support: (i) the efforts of the Secretary General and 
the Security Council of the United Nations, and (ii) the continued work 
of the Conference on Yugoslavia.
41 It is curious to note that on these bases all the states of the former Soviet Union received 
international recognition with little difficulty. Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia already received 
international recognition during September 1991, though their status had been unique as many 
countries had ignored their occupation by the Soviets in 1940 so that the granting of such rec-
ognition had not been necessary.  The states which had then become part of the Community of 
Independent States became members of the United Nations on 2 March 1992.
42  The draft Agreement concerning the Convention, issued on 4 November 1991, had been a 
proposal to form a community of Yugoslav states, which, in keeping with the draft, would have 
been transformed into a special community of sovereign states, organized in accordance with 
the principles of the EU.  This proved to be the last attempt to save Yugoslavia as an integral 
entity.  Though the Convention never came into force, its provisions from Chapter II contain-
ing a catalogue of human rights and protections for minorities, would be accepted.  Similar 
proposals had previously been made by the leadership of the Republics of Croatia and Slovenia. 
See further concerning same in Budislav Vukas, ml., “Prijedlozi i nacrti konfederalizacije Jugo-
slavije 1990/91 – posljednji pokušaj ‘spašavanje’ zajedničke države,” Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u 
Rijeci (2006, 2): 761-805; Budislav Vukas, ml., “Europska zajednica i Konferencija o Jugoslaviji 
u vremenu početaka internacionalizacije jugoslavenske krize - posljednji pokušaj ‘spašavanje’ 
zajedničke države,” Rijeka (2004, 2): 103-109.  The text of the Convention has been published 
along with earlier confederalization proposals related to Yugoslavia by V. Đ. Degan, one of the 
most important experts and an author of such proposals, in his Hrvatska država, p. 281 et seq.
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Those republics which wished to obtain recognition had to submit their 
requests to the Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia and notify the Arbi-
tration Commission.  Further, this very complicated procedure required each 
republic to adopt constitutional and political guarantees ensuring that it had 
no territorial claims towards a neighboring republic or state of the EU and 
that it will conduct no hostile propaganda activities or use any denomination 
which implies any territorial pretensions.43
Looking at the totality of the character and importance of the Opinions of 
the Arbitration Commission and the above-discussed acts related to the in-
ternational recognition of states, we note the position taken by Budislav Vidas 
who argued that they do not consistently respect the criteria for statehood ac-
cepted in the doctrine and practice of international law.44  As we have already 
seen with respect to Opinion No. 1, the Commission took the view that the 
establishment of new states under international law is a question of fact.  With 
respect to the SFRY, it had determined that the government of the Federation 
not longer represented its interests and that, as a result, no organized politi-
cal government existed.  In that context, the Commission, in lieu of further 
analyzing and questioning this fact in its conclusion, insisted only on setting 
forth numerous material and indeed formalistic conditions for granting in-
ternational recognition.  Given that recognition is merely of a declaratory le-
gal nature, the reasons supporting the Commission’s determination to impose 
such complicated procedures to recognize the former Yugoslav republics re-
main unclear.  The Opinions of the Arbitration Commission did not represent 
acts of recognition of new states but merely confirmed the criteria of statehood 
generally accepted in international law.
3.3. Acts Related to the International Recognition of Croatia 13 – 15 
January 1992
Based on the above mentioned conditions, the Republics of Croatia, Slove-
nia and Macedonia as well as the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
43 This curious condition concerns the Republic of Macedonia and Greek demands to condi-
tion its international recognition on the change of its name.  Greece claimed that it (the Hellene 
Republic) represented the sole constitutional heir of Hellenistic statehood and civilization and 
that the use of Macedonia related to ancient Macedonia.  This dispute continues to this day, and 
despite attempts to come to a mutual understanding (e.g., through mediation and the like), it 
has been brought before the International Court of the United Nations where the issue remains 
pending.  Although a majority of nations later recognized Macedonia under its constitutional 
name, it remains a member of the United Nations under the special name “Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia”.  See Službena skraćena i puna hrvatska i engleska imena država (Zagreb: 
Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova RH, September 1996), and later editions.
44 Budislav Vukas, State, Peoples and Minorities (The Hague: Academy of International Law, 
1999), pp. 301, 302.
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submitted their requests for recognition and evidence related to their satisfac-
tion of the above-noted requirements.45
The Arbitration Commission announced its positions related to the re-
quests of the Republics in a series of Opinions dated 11 January 1992 (Opinion 
Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7).  Opinion No. 3 recapitulated the previously mentioned 
application of the principle of uti possidetis iuris to the disintegration of the 
Yugoslav Federation.  Opinion No. 4 also contained a summary of the position 
of the Commission expressed in its prior Opinions, especially concerning the 
basic concepts and principles of international law on the question of statehood 
and the application of same to the Yugoslav situation.  Thus, Opinion Nos. 3 
and 4 can be deemed to be similar to declaratory legal acts, as they pronounce 
previously expressed positions concerning the doctrine and practice of inter-
national law related to states as subjects of same, the prior positions of the 
Commission concerning the application of international law to the Yugoslav 
context and, finally, the position of each of the republics (i.e., the Republics 
of Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia and the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, as well as the remains of Yugoslav governmental organs and the 
Republics of Serbia and Montenegro).  These Opinions thus formed the basis 
45 Serbia and Montenegro did not submit any such requests as they in any event did not meet 
the conditions set forth in the Guidelines and the Declaration.  Their military units had been 
active in the aggression against the Republic of Croatia and along with other violations of in-
ternational law they did not satisfy the necessary criteria.  But their position had also been 
determined based their view that they did not require international recognition as they claimed 
to be successors to the prior state.  They attempted to prove this on 27 April 1992 through the 
adoption of a new Constitution through which a new state called the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (FRY) came into being.  Their position, however, was not accepted as shown by Security 
Council Resolution 777, General Assembly Resolution 47/1 and Opinion Nos. 8, 9 and 10 of the 
Arbitration Commission.  Opinion No. 9 states that no state had the automatic right to succeed 
the SFRY while Opinion No. 10 found the FRY to be a new state which cannot be deemed to be 
a successor to the SFRY.  Based on these findings, the FRY received international recognition 
from the EU only on 29 January 1996.  Only the new Yugoslav leadership elected after the fall 
of Milošević in October 2000 changed its view thus allowing for progress on the question of 
the succession to the former state.  On 25 May 2001 the parties entered into an Agreement on 
Succession Issues in Vienna.  See more details on same in Degan, Hrvatska država, pp. 258-62. 
In March 2002, through the mediation of the EU, a new Agreement concerning future relations 
between the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro was reached, which now came to be called 
the State of Serbia and Montenegro.  With this Agreement, the name Yugoslavia became part of 
history while all questions related to the continuity of Yugoslavia which had been advocated by 
Serbia and Montenegro fell by the wayside.  Concerning that Agreement, see Perunčić-Fabris, 
“Nema više Jugoslavije, nova država Srbija i Crna Gora,” Vjesnik, no. 68, 2002, p. 7 (col. 4-7). 
Based on the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro, Montenegro used its right to 
leave the state alliance, and after a May 2006 plebiscite, proclaimed its independence on 3 June 
2006. The continuity of the prior state, in keeping with the Charter, fell to Serbia.  As of 17 
February 2008, Kosovo also became an independent state, though it has not been recognized by 
certain states.  Despite a 2010 advisory opinion of the International Court of the United Nations, 
Kosovo continues not to be a member of the United Nations as well as of other international 
institutions. 
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for the following series of Opinions, of which Opinion No. 5, entitled “Opin-
ion on the Recognition of the Republic of Croatia by the European Commu-
nity and its Member States,” is the most important.
The Arbitration Commission based Opinion No. 5 on the position tak-
en by the Republic of Croatia (which it had set forth in accordance with its 
obligations under the 19 December 1991 Guidelines and the Declaration on 
Yugoslavia),46 on the prior conclusions made by the Commission and on the 
basic fundamental constitutional decisions concerning the sovereignty of the 
Republic of Croatia.47
As an additional condition for the recognition of the Republic of Croa-
tia, the Commission directed that it had to supplement its Constitutional Law 
Concerning Human Rights and Freedoms and on the Rights of National and 
Ethnic Communities and Minorities in the Republic of Croatia, adopted by 
the Parliament on 4 December 1991, so as to satisfy the provisions of the Con-
vention of the Conference of Yugoslavia, especially those found in Chapter II, 
Article 2(c), under the heading “Special Status” (this Convention relates to the 
draft concerning the proposed confederal alliance of sovereign states, analyzed 
further above, which included a very detailed system of protections for human 
rights and minorities).48.  The Republic of Croatia agreed to satisfy this condi-
tion, and it subsequently adopted a Constitutional Law to that effect.49
On the basis of all of the above, the Commission concluded that “subject to 
this reservation, the Republic of Croatia meets the necessary conditions for its 
recognition by the Member States of the European Community in accordance 
with the Declaration on Yugoslavia and the Guidelines on the Recognition of 
New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, adopted by the Council 
of the European Communities on 16 December 1991.”
46 This document is entitled “Answers to the Declaration on Yugoslavia and to the Declaration 
to the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union,” 
which had been sent by the President of the Republic of Croatia through the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Croatia.  See the text in Milardović, Dokumenti o državnosti, op. cit, pp. 
143.-147.  The President of the Republic responded to additional questions of the Commission 
in a telegram sent on 10 January 1992.
47 The Commission considered the following acts: Responses to the questions sent by the Com-
mission to the interested republics on 24 December 1991; a document sent as a confirmation of 
recognition sent by the President of the Republic of Croatia on 19 December 1991; the Christ-
mas Constitution; the Report Concerning the Results of the 19 May 1991 Referendum; the Con-
stitutional Decision and Constitutional Declaration of 25 June 1991, and the Constitutional Law 
Concerning Human Rights and Freedoms and on the Rights of National and Ethnic Communi-
ties and Minorities in the Republic of Croatia of 4 December 1991.
48 See footnote 42.
49 Concerning the criticisms of the Arbitration Commission and other questions concerning 
the rights of minorities in Croatia during that time, see Budislav Vukas, “The legal status of mi-
nority in Croatia,” in:  Minorities in Europe, Croatia, Estonia, Slovenia (The Hague: TMC Asser 
Institut, 1994), pp. 39-63.
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The Republic of Croatia ended its long and very complicated process of 
achieving international recognition on 15 January 1992 when João de Deus 
Pinheiro, presiding over the Ministerial Council of the EU, released in the 
name of the Council, an announcement which, in its initial provisions, notes 
that it: “wishes to advise that, in keeping with the Declaration of 16 December 
1991 on the recognition of states and its application to Yugoslavia and in light 
of the advise of the Arbitration Commission, the Union and her member states 
have determined, in keeping with such provisions and with corresponding na-
tional procedures, to recognize Slovenia and Croatia.”50
The Republic of Croatia had been, despite the procedures set forth in the 
framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia, previously recognized by a num-
ber of states, including the Holy See.51  There followed the collective recogni-
tion by the member states of the EU on 15 January 1992 along with that of a 
number of other countries.  This collective international recognition provid-
ed a clear indication that, in spite of conditions of extreme complexity, other 
countries around the globe would also extend recognition to the Republic 
(which indeed occurred soon afterward).  This would represent the beginning 
of the period of the international affirmation of the Republic of Croatia as an 
independent and sovereign player in modern international relations.  After the 
Republic of Croatia received recognition from the United States (7 April 1992), 
it became a permanent member in the United Nations on 22 May 1992, thus 
ending this period of its international affirmation.
4. Concluding Observations
Discussing the processes related to the establishment of the Republic of 
Croatia as an independent and sovereign state, it is not difficult to perceive 
their special complexity conditioned by internal Yugoslav and general inter-
national relations.  Croatia had an especially challenging position with respect 
to obtaining its independence in contrast to many new democracies of East-
ern Europe and the new states created as a result of the collapse of the USSR. 
One must conclude that in such circumstances the government of the Republic 
of Croatia adopted a policy that was exemplary and cautionary, as exhibited 
by the measured process of the constitutional proclamation of state indepen-
dence.  The Croatian President had the overwhelming support of the Parlia-
ment and the Government and had much experience in understanding the 
50  Izjava predsjedavajućega Ministarskog vijeća Europske zajednice o priznavanju jugoslaven-
skih republika, quoted in Milardović, Dokumenti o državnosti, p. 153
51  The first to recognize the Republic of Croatia on 26 June 1991 was the Republic of Slovenia, 
followed by the Republic of Lithuania (30 July 1991), Ukraine (11 December 1991), the Republic 
of Latvia (14 December 1991), Iceland (19 December 1991), the Federal Republic of Germany 
(19 December 1991), the Republic of Estonia (31 December 1991), the Holy See (13 January 
1992) and the Republic of San Marino (14 January 1992).
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workings of the Yugoslav state and political horse-trading.  He very skillfully 
but in a timely manner made fundamental decisions concerning statehood. 
Displaying extreme tact toward players in the international community, Croa-
tia knew when it had to take such decisions, when to stall them and when to 
finally and without conditions bring them to fruition.
The international affirmation of the Republic of Croatia as an independent 
subject of international law followed in its entirety the relations among the 
major powers concerning their policies toward the Yugoslav crisis.  In consid-
ering the very complicated and long term process with respect to international 
recognition of the state’s independence, which had been subject to numerous 
preconditions, it is clear that the leading players in the international commu-
nity had been relatively slow, but in the end they nevertheless had to accept 
the new realities in the Central and Southeastern European region – and this 
primarily resulted from the determination of the new states themselves with 
their clear and uncompromising goals.
With respect to the new goals of the EU to expand to include the states 
which succeeded to the territory of the former SFRY (beginning with the ad-
mission of Slovenia into the EU in 2004), the act of international recognition 
of Croatian independence by the then twelve member states of the EU repre-
sented the beginning of a long period of interaction between European insti-
tutions and the Republic of Croatia.  Often described as a “long” or “difficult” 
road toward membership in the EU, this actually led to the satisfaction of other 
basic foreign policy goals of the Croatian Republic.
At the end of this discussion, one must ask to what extent is the path that 
Croatia followed toward the establishment of its independence known within 
Croatia?  Unfortunately, it is especially poorly appreciated, which is not helped 
by the fact that practically every new Government has engaged in unnecessary 
re-examinations and reinterpretations of these events.  Although the new sys-
tem of state holidays in the Republic of Croatia (enacted by the 2001 Law on 
Holidays, Memorial Days and Non-Working Days in the Republic of Croatia) 
is clearer and legally more precise than the 1991 law on the same topic, state 
holidays, especially due to their revisions, continue to cause confusion and 
uncertainty. Such trends may in fact be supported by some circles among the 
Croatian elite, but it remains to historians, legal scholars and pedagogues to 
carry out their primary mission to provide an exact explanation. This work 
seeks to play a small part in such attempts.
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Der Prozess der Herstellung der Unabhängigkeit von der 
Republik Kroatien aus der Perspektive des internationalen 
Rechtes 
Zusammenfassung
Als Kroatien unlängst den zwanzigsten Jahrestag der Erklärung seiner 
staatlichen Unabhängigkeit feierte, tauchte Frage auf, ob der komplexe Prozess 
der Herstellung seiner Staatlichkeit wohl verstanden ist. Die Antworten auf 
diese Frage sind wirklich unglaublich, wenn sie vonseiten vieler Tatsachen be-
trachtet werden, beginnend mit einer so fundamentalen Tatsache als Zeitungs-
Umfragen unter kroatischen Bürgern. 
Der Autor beschreibt auf welche Weise die Souveränität und die Unab-
hängigkeit Kroatiens hergestellt wurden. Seine Darstellung beginnt er mit 
dem konstitutionellen Prozess der Erklärung der staatlichen Unabhängigkeit 
und setzt fort mit der Abbrechung sämtlicher staatsrechtlichen Verbindungen 
Kroatiens mit der jugoslawischen Föderation und ihren Teilrepubliken sowie 
mit darauf folgenden Auseinandersetzungen um internationale Anerkennung 
Kroatiens.  Im Artikel werden schlüsselartige konstitutionelle Entscheidun-
gen des kroatischen Parlaments in den Jahren 1990 und 1991 besprochen, die 
die Grundlage des Inhaltes der Proklamation der Unabhängigkeit der Repu-
blik Kroatien bildeten (von der sog. Weihnachtsverfassung bis zu den parla-
mentarischen Entscheidungen vom 25. Juni 1991 und vom 8. Oktober 1991). 
Der Autor untersucht die Wichtigkeit dieser Entscheidungen vom rechtlichen 
Standpunkt aus, indem er die von den führenden Rechtwissenschaftlern ver-
tretenden Standpunkte zu dieser Frage berücksichtigt. Zudem wird in diesem 
Artikel der Prozess der internationalen Anerkennung der Republik Kroatien 
besprochen, und vor allem werden die Politiken der Mitgliedstaaten der Euro-
päischen Gemeinschaft sowie die Jugoslawien-Konferenz und die Arbitrage-
Kommission (welche von der EG gegründet wurde mit dem Ziel, die Unab-
hängigkeitserklärungen der neu zu anerkennenden Staaten vom rechtlichen 
Standpunkt aus zu untersuchen, um fundamentale Bedingungen zu erfühlen) 
analysiert. Die ehemaligen jugoslawischen Teilrepubliken wurden nämlich 
verpflichtet, diese Bedingungen zu erfühlen, als Voraussetzung für ihre inter-
nationale Anerkennung.
Dieser Text beinhaltet einen kurzen Überblick historischer Geschehnisse 
sowie im einleitenden Teil eine Analyse des Begriffes „Staat“ und seiner Funk-
tion des dominantesten Subjekten im internationalen Rechte.  
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